5. Bomber or attack/fighter?

In 1962, in a responsible and real-life mode, I first became involved in the selection of the most effective option for the IEAF, i.e. between adding a light bomber squadron to the existing arsenal and strengthening the existing Attack/Fighter force, which was spearheaded by the F-86Fs. I had just been promoted from being at the head of Wing Maintenance at Asmara air force base to Director of Materiel at Head Quarters. From this position, the incumbent also served as one of the three members of the commander’s staff. When I was serving in Asmara the Chief of Staff, General Aseffa Ayene, had been following my progress in flying the new types that the IEAF had started operating since I left for higher studies five years before, with perhaps a little more interest than warranted. After all, of what significance could my ambition to test fly all equipment that my aircraft maintenance outfit checked, repaired or overhauled be? The base commander, Col. Aberra Woldemariam did not object to this ambition. The Wing Commander, my same entry friend Capt. Yohannes Woldemariam, not only enthusiastically supported the idea of receiving a test-flown airplane after visits to the maintenance facility but also personally checked me out on all the types in his command. If the type to be test flown was a two seat trainer, one of the technicians who worked on it would ‘win’ the opportunity to fly with me during the test flight. There was no rule to prohibit such practice and, what was even more encouraging, the technicians loved the practice and became prouder of their work. I was having great fun with this hands-on work when Gen. Aseffa Ayene opted to have me head the support activities at HQ, no doubt due to my double qualification, over my friend Capt. Mohammed Ahmed who was acting in that position. Capt. Mohammed pragmatically requested and succeeded in leaving the IEAF to join the Ethiopian Airlines as an aeronautical engineer.

IEAF’s HQ was, and still is nearly fifty years later, housed at the Harer-Meda base in Bishoftu. Col. Aseffa Gebre-Igzy, the same second entry officer mentioned earlier in a bad weather episode and a close same entry friend of my older brother Addamu, was the base commander at Harer-Meda. He was operational on the F-86F and had positive influence in the air force’s evolution. Upon my arrival from Asmara to Bishoftu, he made me feel at home instantly, despite the many years of separation, and encouraged me in my pursuit of the very same goal of flying the types being operated on the base. When it came to checking out on the F-86F however, I came across some resistance from the squadron commander, Capt. Getachew Negash. Moreover, the ratio of operational pilots to the number of F-86Fs was abysmally low rendering the squadrons less effective than they could have been. He wanted to train operational pilots and not higher-ranking staff pilots like myself. While I not only agreed but also supported the objective of increasing operational pilot to airplane ration to three or above on the F-86Fs, I could not support the idea of not checking out staff officers in the absence of numerous incoming squadron pilots. Not only could high ranking pilots lighten the load on operational pilots, by taking over non-combat flying for example, but would also be a positive force in improving the environment under which combat operations are carried out by virtue of their position of high responsibility. The more pressing and fundamental problem seemed to be that a perfect match between the flying school output and demand for pilots, by the various entities, was not in place.

Therefore, I set out to work to bring out the operational capability of our fighting force prevalent at the time in comparison with similar sized forces in other air forces. My findings were that our air force wanted in most areas compared to say an equivalent sized force of Israel, the most important aspects being the following.

• On the ground at the three main bases, weaknesses in fuel supply facilities and shortages in the array of armament for the war planes seriously compromised turn around time and flexible use of the flying platforms and hence, reducing the air force’s fighting capacity.

• Communication facility and protection of our attack fighters from air or ground strikes on turn around or parked periods were inadequate.

• Budgetary appropriations from the Ethiopian Government did not support the required level of flying to train and maintain the required number of pilots for the effective use of the attack fighters on hand.

• Capital expenditure to improve and/or add ground infrastructure for greater flexibility as well as improved efficiency and effectiveness of the existing war planes was woefully inadequate.

• The provisioning support that the US Air Force has committed for, under the military assistance program prevalent at the time, was limited to peace time training activities and could not match the brewing hostilities that Somalia brandished with the assistance of the Soviet Union.

• We had a flight of four F-86Fs in the Congo serving with the UN forces, a situation that did not help us prepare for a possible conflict with the then main adversary in spite of the modest training that was conducted at UN expense.

• We barely reached one operational combat pilot per available aircraft.

The cumulative effect of the main deficiencies enumerated above was that, for example, while an F-86F if properly supported could sustain ten combat sorties per day over a possible three weeks period it now had the capacity to do perhaps just two a day. The potential for a four-fold increase in striking power without additional airplanes but with a sizable increase in operational expense for training was there. My initial task therefore became to convince key members of the general staff, head of operations Gen. Merkorios Haile and head of administration Gen. Taye Tilahun in particular, of the urgent need to rectify the situation on all fronts and commit on a plan of action that could be supported by the Ethiopian and US governments. Gen. Merkorios started as a communications officer in the first entry and Gen. Taye as a pilot in the second entry. Although my seniors, both were good friends of mine, especially Taye with whom I had flown in the same squadron out of Jijjiga in 1972.

Coincidentally, Brigadier General Clayton Isaacson (Ike) was assigned the chief of the air force section at the Military Assistance Advisory Group or MAAG of the USA in Addis Ababa. He was not only very helpful in our attempt to make the few North American F-86Fs we had as effective as possible but also in realizing their replacement, the Norththrop F-5As. Ike was not just a 2^nd WW ace fighter pilot but had flown combat on jets in Korea and earned the coveted membership of the worldwide Eagles Club. A thin very tall Midwesterner of Norwegian extraction, he had an outgoing personality and a love for the outdoors, which struck a cord with both Maj. Gizaw Gedle-Giorgis and me whose hobbies were hunting. After his service with IEAF, Maj. Gizaw became the Chief Game Warden and later a professional hunter but was superb in taking Bruce, Ike’s eldest teenager son, under his wings. Ike’s young family with four teenagers personified honest and hard working America at its best. Spending long weekends in the bush lead to uninhibited discussions on all maters and his genuine desire to help America win friends became very clear. The fact that Kennedy’s new frontier administration emphasised community development must have helped this process, but in a very short time, we became friends. It was a friendship that saw him as my best man at our wedding in June 1963 and one that lasted a lifetime until we interned him at Arlington Memorial in the late nineties. My commander in chief saw him as a positive force and allowed our relationship to develop. In fact, by way of breaking the closed circuit thinking of our fighter squadron commander, he let himself be persuaded to let qualified USAF officers fly training sorties with our pilots and thereby enabling me to fly T-33s & F-86F with Ike. I learned some interesting manoeuvres from an ace fighter pilot but his most touching aspect was his unreserved and total involvement in the friendship he made. For example, when our revolution was running amok and I had fallen out with the revolutionary regime in 1976, I sent him a snapshot of our three children aged 10, 8 and 6 while playing on the beach at Lake Langano. He promptly responded, “I can read between the lines. If we can get them out, send them and I shall raise them like my own”. Not many offered such assistance.

One could not gloss over IEAF’s equipment shortage. This was partly due to the US policy during the Kennedy administration against an arms race in the Horn of Africa. Our government’s expectation from US military assistance programme was much higher than offered. At the same time, the realization of the county’s inability to counter massively Soviet backed Somalia was highly disturbing to us. Something had to be done. As the realization of the imminent danger from Soviet assisted Somalia sank deeper in the policy-making sectors of the Ethiopian government, a surprise decision was communicated to the air force, namely the planned acquisition of a bomber squadron for which we were asked to submit a plan and budget for its integration. The Canberra light bomber would be bought out-right from Ethiopian sources without assistance from the US. We worked out a global figure to integrate a Canberra squadron consisting of ten airplanes and keep the squadron operational over a ten-year period. We could not visualize how a country as poor as Ethiopia could bear such a cost. It was roughly equal to three times the then current yearly expenditure of the entire air force. How can a government that is stingy when it comes to increasing operating costs for greater effectiveness of already integrated airplanes embark on new venture of this magnitude? Therefore, to counter the enemy more effectively we advised our Chief of Staff, Gen. Aseffa Ayene, that we should stop the purchase of the proposed light bomber squadron and use only part of the funds so saved to strengthen our US supplied ground-attack/fighter force. To simulate what the bombers could accomplish with their longer range, we proposed to extend the reach of our ground-attack/fighter via satellite air-bases. The greater carrying capacity of the bomber would be equated by the higher frequency of attacks by the ground-attack/fighter. We reasoned that the bomber project would not only weaken our ability to strike at the enemy’s military capability but also be cause to further strengthening the enemy by us acquiring offensive capability. I felt that, as professionals, we should not accept solutions that did not counter the threats posed by the enemy’s military and that, in case political solutions removed the threat, we must go with a plan that offers substantial economic residual value. We worked on an alternate plan that involved allocations from both the US and Ethiopian governments but at a much lower level than what we calculated would be needed to integrate an effective bomber squadron.

The grand plan included satellite airports, for both civilian and military uses, at a radius of four to five hundred kilometres from Harer-Meda and suitably located for economic development purposes. In this regard, the most pressing at Gode, in the Ogaden, was built but the other near Omedla, in western Begemidir, fizzled out. At all airports, including the ones where attack/fighters would stage through, bunkers and suitably located communications and support resources, such as fuel, armament, etc., were to be made available. Early warning and guiding facility was an essential part of the plan. The objective was to move all necessary elements to a satellite base for a sustained effort in the area. From Gode, for instance, all targets on the way and up to both Berbera and Mogadishu are well with range and, because of the shorter distance to be flown and at the higher speeds, treble the sorties a Canberra makes can be realized by an F-86F bringing its delivery capability on par with that of the light bomber. In addition, the spread and accuracy of delivered weaponry would be much better and with no need for fighter escort. Training of pilots was to be focused on stopping ground forces but at the same time gaining air superiority at low altitudes through defensive tactics against the superior equipment availed by the Soviet Union to Somalia. I was aware that the turn around time of a comparable aircraft in Israel Air Force, which was a secret at the time and I had not divulged it third parties, was 6 minutes. We set a goal of 15 minutes for ours. It meant that a fully briefed pilot would be waiting for an incoming F-86F, or later F-5A, to be refuelled and re-armed and take-off in less than 15 minutes after it touched down. The logistics, training, communication and intelligence gathering requirements were very great but the rewards would be much greater. The whole idea was to amass hidden strength and flexibility while lulling the enemy into complacency as opposed to a show of great force to instil fear.

Our Chief of Staff not only bought the plan but also immediately started making forceful moves to gain its acceptance at the highest levels of government. We conformed to US policy against arms race even though we estimated that our strike capability would at least quadruple. As can be imagined, selling the idea was much easier than implementing it. Within the Ethiopian government, advocates for an offensive force, or bombers for the IEAF, were no pushovers. Although a couple high-ranking politicians were openly advocating that course of action, I could not really understand what threat to the country motivated them. Except for the efforts made by the IEAF in intelligence gathering, no central source has ever given us an evaluation of threats facing the country, let alone as it affects the option of acquiring bombers. Certainly, Somalia, or even the Sudan for that matter, did not have industrial complexes that are vital to their possible war efforts. On the other hand, high level bombing of an urban area such as Mogadishu, if ever the Canberra were able to get there unescorted, would be counter productive to our war effort, in that it would antagonize the civilian population and turn them into rabid supporters of their dictatorial Siad Barre regime. However, we persisted in our attempt to keep the IEAF focused on the real military threats and in countering it as simply and as effectively as the country’s human and economic resources could sustain.

Before accepting our plan however, the government required consultation by an outside expert body. A suggestion was for a UK based one, which the staff objected to on grounds of conflict of interest since the Canberra is built there. Our suggestion for USAF advice was rejected due to their stated position, which was inline with US geo-political posture regarding the Horn of Africa. Both parties accepted my proposal to get advice from Israel Air Force experts, since their competence was undisputed and they had sound motivation to strengthen Ethiopia. General Hod, who headed IAF operations, accompanied by a technical person arrived to review all aspects and give his recommendations. In the summer of 1960 when I spent a couple of months in Israel studying IAF practices, the Commander in Chief, General Ezra Weitzman, had received me at lunch to better understand my mission there and then handed me over to Gen. Hod with a brief to withhold nothing from me. I had spent time with Gen. Hod and his people to learn about their operations and even flown Meteors and Helicopters to experience the rather restricted space they were operating in. I had also spent time with the technical chief of IAF and his people as well as with training and human resource staff. During the discussion of findings and recommendations, not to everybody’s delight, my familiarity with these fine individuals must have helped to bring to the fore their candid and direct style of delivery. Gen. Hod ruled out the Canberra, or the French built swept wing light bomber IAF was operating, as our solution for the same reasons we had advanced. He said that, if we persisted, we could have the light bomber squadron IAF was operating but it would be against his advice since we should learn from their mistakes. He took a compass and drew two semicircles with a radius of an F-86F’s operating range, one centred on Mogadishu and the other on Berbera. Within the overlapping area of the two semicircles Gode, on the Wabi Shebelle valley, was smack in the centre. On much more than the above two issues, his independently arrived at recommendations were so close to our plan that Gen. Aseffa Ayene looked at me quizzically, as if asking if there was collusion of sorts.

Finally, with such high powered endorsement of our plan, the Canberra project went to sleep but, to my dismay, it resurfaced years later when most of us who rejected it were out of the IEAF picture. For that crucial period however, attack/fighters won the day and the Ethiopian government started the investment program at Gode which meant that:

• Stopping the enemy’s military on the ground, if necessary before it entered the country, was confirmed as the primary mission of the IEAF and that this will be accomplished with complete air superiority at low altitudes.

• IEAF will rely on perfect training of its pilots to extract best performance from fewer airplanes at high utilization, especially in defence against specific enemy airplanes that could be of higher performance than its own.

• The concept of operating flexibly and effectively from multiple bases for wider reach was chosen over amassing longer range bombers for propaganda or deterrent purposes.

• Keeping the array of aircraft and weaponry as simple as possible, for greater effectiveness at acceptable and bearable cost, would help in reaching IEAF’s goal of reducing dependence on foreign assistance.

Although watered down in the subsequent years before the actual armed conflict with Somalia flared in 1977, I believe that the course IEAF took at this juncture saved the day against the much greater numbers of higher performance aircraft the enemy fielded. The irony was that politically the Soviet Union was on the side of Ethiopia which was fighting with American equipment and the USA was on the side of Somalia. As the much faster and higher flying Mig-21s were being downed by the F-5s whenever they made contact, it is said that Americans, whose protégé was loosing the war, were jubilant and that some red faces were noticed among Russian advisors to the Ethiopian government.